tor's price reductions, often without an opportunity to contact individual customers to determine whether the seller can meet the competitor's offer in an identical fashion. Thus, competitive market conditions may compel a seller to implement pricing reductions within a narrowly defined geographic area that directly correlates with the known area in which a competitor has made similar price concessions. In Vanco Beverage, Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, held the practice of area-wide price reductions permissible under the meeting competition defense of the Robinson-Patman Act if the seller reasonably believes in good faith that a competitor's lower price is generally available throughout the same market within the same time period, even if the area-wide price attracts new customers.
This comment traces the history of area-wide pricing under the section 2(b) meeting competition defense 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act. 5 It then analyzes the Supreme Court's recent decision in Vanco Beverage. 6 Finally, the comment concludes with predictions concerning both the implications of Vanco Beverage and future judicial limitations on the practice of area-wide pricing.
I. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 as an amendment to the Clayton Act. 8 The Robinson-Patman Act encourages price accounts communicated with each other and with all of the wholesale bakeries. Price reductions to one account did not long remain secret. We conclude, therefore, that there was a reasonable basis for Continental's assumption that a new price offered to one of its accounts by a competitor, which Continental did verify, would become available with or without its assistance to all of its existing and prospective customers. 11. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982) . When a discriminating seller inflicts competitive injury at the buyer level, it is identified as secondary line injury. If a seller complains of another seller's unlawful price discriminations to its customers, the resultant anticompetitive effect is termed primary line injury. For a general discussion of the two types of injury, see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967) Customers of a seller that has suffered a primary line injury suffer tertiary line injury. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647 (1969), the Supreme Court read the Act as protecting buyer competition to the fourth level of distribution (i.e., customers of customers of the seller).
12. The Supreme Court in Vanco Beverage set forth the following explanation of the difference between "economic price discrimination" and price discrimination for Robinson-Patman Act purposes:
"Economic" price discrimination consists in selling a product to different customers at prices that bear different ratios to the marginal costs of sales to those customers, for example, charging the same price to two customers despite the fact that the seller incurs higher costs to serve one than the other, or charging different prices to two customers despite the fact that the seller's costs of service are the same. Price discrimination under neous interstate sales; 13 (2) was between competing purchasers of goods 14 that were of like grade and quality; 15 and (3) resulted in an adverse effect on competition. 16 A seller's practice, however, of discriminating in price because of cost differences in processing or marketing the product is not actionable under the Robinson-Patman Act. 1 7 In addition, a seller does not violate the Act if it offers a lower price in favor of one customer over another in order to meet a competitor's price to the favored customer. 18 Price discriminations are prima facie illegal under section 2(a) when their effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to the Robinson-Patman Act, however, "is merely a price difference. 18. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982) . The Supreme Court, by a five to four decision, held in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 103 S. Ct. 1011 Ct. , 1014 Ct. (1983 , that the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act did not support extension of the government sales exemption, which removes government sales from the purview of Robinson-Patman, to the sale of pharmaceutical products to state and local government hospitals for resale in competition with private pharmacies.
The judiciary has created an availability defense to a § 2(a) violation when a seller makes the lowest of two or more varying prices equally available to all its buyers. create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." 19 Although a "mere possibility" of injury will not suffice, 20 a plaintiff need not demonstrate actual injury to procure relief. Congress designed the Act to reach price discriminations before competition was harmed.
21
In J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. ,22 the Supreme Court severely limited the effect of this statutory language when it held that "even if there has been a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, petitioner is not excused from its burden of proving antitrust injury and damages. '23 The Payne Court dismissed an automobile dealer's claim for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act against an automobile manufacturer who paid a bonus to dealers who exceeded their quotas for car sales. The Court indicated that proof of a violation of section 2(a) of Robinson-Patman does not automatically suggest that the disfavored customer was injured within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 24 The Court therefore held that even if there had been a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act the plaintiff must prove antitrust injury and damages.
25

B. The Meeting Competition Defense.
Under section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act a seller may rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination by demonstrating that the "lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor." 26 If the elements of section 2(b) are satisfied, the defense is absolute even 19. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982 though the price discrimination injures competition or is not a mathematically precise response to a competitor's lower price. 27 Courts are divided over whether a seller must have actual knowledge that a buyer has received an offer as opposed to mere knowledge of a competitor's pricing practices before the seller can lower prices to meet the competition. 28 In the vast majority of cases involving the meeting competition defense, the buyer has received an offer from a competitor, and has communicated that lower offer to the seller before the discriminating seller has instituted a price reduction. 29 Courts, however, have evaluated the merits of a section 2(b) defense on an ad hoc basis when the seller has no knowledge of the exact identity of the competing offeror or the price it is charging. Court held that the section 2(b) defense is available only when the price discriminating seller can "show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor. ' defendant's "resort to other seller verification as a means of checking the buyer's reliability" 37 because of Sherman Act section 1 prohibitions. The Court indicated, however, that if a seller received either reports of similar discounts from other customers or a threat of termination if the seller did not meet the buyer's offer, it need not further verify the competitor's prices for purposes of section 2(b). 38 The The seller must not only receive information on the competing offer from reliable sources, but must also be confident that the pricing information relates to a geographic market region that is substantially similar to its buyer's area of business. What is required is a showing of reliability of the informant who has personal knowledge of the bidding, coupled with an attempt to investigate by asking for more information about the competitive bid and the making of a credible threat of termination of purchases in the absence of a second offer. 575 F. Supp. at 399 (citingA&P, 440 U.S. at 84 n.17) (emphasis added). [Vol. 1983 [Vol. :1308 A buyer who refuses to discuss the existence or nature of a competitor's bid places a seller in a precarious position. 43 The seller, although generally obligated to meet only individual competitive offers, is forbidden under Gypsum to verify a price with competing sellers, 44 and may be unable to ascertain from the buyer the specific terms of the (1) Establish firm list prices, if that is the way the industry operates, with discounts on a cost justified basis, and a policy, communicated to all sales people, to stay "on scale." (c) Memoranda of their conversations with customers during which the latter have reported competitive offers. These memoranda should be personalized as much as possible so that both the salesman and the buyer actually will remember the occasion if they are refreshed from the memoranda. Also include "lost customer" reports when a reported competitive offer has not been met, and the business has been lost. Precautions should be taken to ensure that these are truthful. The company's showing of "good faith" will be seriously jeopardized if salesmen's reports are produced but customers deny that they are true. 44. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 458 (1978) ("To recognize even a limited 'controlling circumstance' exception for interseller verification in such circumstances would be to remove from scrutiny under the Sherman Act conduct falling near its core with no assurance, and indeed with serious doubts, that competing antitrust policies would be served thereby.").
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lowed sellers to match a competitor's lawful pricing or discount system, and to offer an area-wide discount or price without requiring them to analyze each meeting competition situation on an individual basis. 
C. Initial Judicial Reaction to Area-Wide Quantity Discounts or
Pricing Under the Robinson-Patman Act.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first court of appeals to sanction a seller's blanket price reductions that had been prompted by the "necessities of competition. ' 46 In Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co. 47 the defendant lowered the price of its ice cream sold to retailers in the Los Angeles area. Competition among ice cream suppliers in Los Angeles was especially fierce and manufacturers deviated greatly from their list prices in their attempts to lure customers. The defendant ice cream manufacturer admitted that it had not responded to individual, competitive situations, but instead had instituted a "'blanket price cut' . . . to eliminate a great many of the chiseling cuts, special advantages and rebates given by its competitors. '48 The Balian decision did not indicate whether all buyers in the market were cognizant of all available offers. The court did suggest that a seller could implement a blanket price reduction without reference to a specific buyer-seller relationship if three factors were present. First, the price cuts must be available only in a restricted geographic area. Second, the seller's actions must be in response to improper rebates and illegal price concessions. Finally, the competition in the market must be "so intense that the price structure for said products [is] very badly broken down." '49 In a 1966 case, Forster Manufacturing Co. v. FTC, 50 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit allowed a defendant to raise a section 2(b) defense even though the defendant had not confirmed with each customer that the buyer had actually received a com- 
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petitor's "1 case free with purchase of 10" offer. would conclude that the adopted system is a reasonable method of meeting the lower price of a competitor that it is condemned. 63 an independent baker claimed that defendant Continental discriminated in price between northern California buyers who bought private label bread and those who bought advertised bread. Continental reduced its price on private label bread to all its customers in northern California although Continental had not attempted to verify that each of its buyers had actually received an equally low competitor's offer in that region. Continental's private label bread prices in neighboring Nevada were consistently higher than its northern California prices. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that "marketwide price reductions are fatal to a section 2(b) defense in all instances." 64 Instead, section 2(b) permits a seller to reduce prices in an area coextensive with a territory in which a competitor has offered its lower prices. The Inglis rule that "[m]arketwide price reductions are permissible when there is a reasonable basis to believe that equally low offers are available from competitors throughout the market ' 6 5 was premised on the Supreme Court's standard enunciated in A. E. Staley. 6 6 Hence, the Ninth Circuit held that Continental could not escape its verification duty in the private label bread market, "given the smaller number of private label accounts" 67 and the relative ease of contacting a few customers in a well-defined geographic region to determine if those buyers had actually received an equally low offer from a competitor. 68 The Inglis decision demonstrates the importance of adequate verification of a competitor's prices in a meeting competition situation. If a seller is responding to a competitor's area-wide price reductions in a market where a competitor's prices can be easily verified, the seller must rigorously validate the parameters of the competitor's sale terms. In addition, a seller can implement area-wide reductions under Inglis only if the market structure is intensely price competitive and the seller does not possess any other practical alternative to meeting a competi- 65. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1046. 66. The Inglis court, however, issued two caveats. The seller who reduces prices without evidence that its buyers received similar offers must be cautious that the price reductions are only offered in an area in which its competitors' prices are equally low. "[Tihe price competition zone cannot be perceived to be smaller than the zone of price reduction." Id In addition, "a defendant may not use the existence of a competitive offer to one of its customers as an excuse to reduce aggressively prices to others when it has no reasonable basis to believe that competitors are extending similar offers throughout the market" during a similar time period. Id 67. Id at 1045-48. 68. The Inglis decision, and its forerunners, apparently indicated that sellers could reduce prices on a regional basis to meet competition without incurring liability under § 2(a). Inglis, however, did not grant sellers a carte blanche to meet competitive offers without actually verifying the existence of an outstanding offer. Id at 1047. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendant Continental on § 2(b) grounds, holding that the trial court's ruling in favor of Continental was not defensible on meeting competition grounds because Continental should have provided detailed verification of the existence of a competitor's price reductions in the private label market.
wide price reduction than when a seller met competition on a one-onone basis. 69 If a seller verified fully the terms of a competitor's zone price cuts and limited its response to the same geographic area, an area-wide price reduction might have been permissible. The propriety of the price reduction would depend on whether the market was intensely price competitive and whether the seller offered the terms only to its customers within the competitive region. 70 If the seller failed to observe these requirements, the courts would apply the traditional rule that a seller could meet competition only on an individual basis. 71 69. The Inglis court also indicated that sellers could employ market-wide price reductions to attract new customers. Id at 1047. Prior to Vanco Beverage three courts of appeals permitted a seller to reduce prices to existing and prospective customers under section 2(b):
If, in situations where the Section 2(b) proviso is applicable, sellers could grant good faith competitive price reductions only to old customers in order to retain them, competition for new customers would be stifled and monopoly would be fostered. In such situations an established seller would have a monopoly of hfr customers and a seller entering the market would not be permitted to reduce his price to compete with his established rivals unless he could do so on a basis such as cost justification. Moreover, the distinction would create a forced price discrimination between a seller's existing customers to whom he had lawfully lowered his price under Section 2(b) and a prospective new customer. These results, we believe, are incompatible with the purpose for which the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted. 71. The Fifth Circuit in General Gas Corp. v. Nat'l Utilities Co., 271 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1959) (quoting unpublished trial court opinion), addressed one alleged "evil" consequence of area-wide pricing:
It appears from the evidence here that competitors of the defendant corporation were cutting their prices from time to time on a customer basis and, while defendant contends that its broad price cuts in the Athens and Gainesville areas were good faith reductions to meet the equally low price of a competitor, it seems clear that there is this situation: The competitors of General were struggling for business and cutting prices on a customer basis and defendant, General, becoming tired of the struggle customer by customer, declared war with a drastic price reduction over the area in which plaintiff competes. 76 Falls City conceded that it sold beer to its Kentucky distributors at lower prices without any cost justification but maintained that it was only "meeting competition" under section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act because its statewide lower price in Kentucky was adopted "in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. '77 Vanco Beverage claimed that Falls City had not met the competition's lower prices in Kentucky, but rather had engaged in offensive price maximization in Indiana. But the district court agreed that Falls City created the price disparity by raising its Indiana prices rather than reducing its prices in Kentucky to meet a competitor's price. 78 But the district court rejected Vanco Beverage's Sherman Act section 1 claim that Falls City set its Indiana prices in accordance with an agreement with other brewers.
Id
79
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. Chief Judge Walter J. Cummings, writing for the majority, 80 relied on the Supreme Court's decision in A.E. Staley:
[Section 2(b)] "places emphasis on individual situations, rather than upon a general system of competition," and is designed to allow a seller to defend his business against genuine price competition. However, the exception does not justify the maintenance of discriminatory pricing among classes of customers that results merely from the adoption of a competitor's discriminatory pricing structure.
8 '
The majority opinion found no evidence that Falls City adopted "a non-discriminatory pricing structure and then reduced prices where necessary to defend against competition" in Kentucky. 82 The majority held that the meeting competition defense did not apply because the price differences between Indiana and Kentucky wholesalers "resulted from price increases in Indiana, not price decreases in Kentucky." prices on an area-wide basis in order to meet competition. 84 He suggested that the section 2(b) defense should not be limited to meeting competition in individial situations because Falls City did not follow a competitor's illegal pricing system in Indiana and because the district court had not found any Sherman Act section 1 violation. The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit. Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, evaluated Falls City's meeting competition defense by dividing the Seventh Circuit's analysis into three distinct components. First, the court of appeals had disallowed the meeting competition defense because it found that the difference in Falls City's wholesale beer prices between Henderson, Kentucky and Evansville, Indiana "'resulted from price increases in Indiana, not price decreases in Kentucky.' "86 Second, the court of appeals had addressed whether a seller may employ the meeting competition defense to attract new customers or only to retain old customers. 87 Third, the court of appeals had held that sellers may not avail themselves of the meeting competition defense by adopting an area-wide price in response to a competitor's prevailing prices throughout its sales territory.
"The seller is not required to show that the price] difference resulted from subtraction rather than addition. "1 8 8
The Supreme Court initially engaged in an extensive analysis of its earlier decision in A.E.
Staley. 8 9
The Court distinguished the Vanco Beverage controversy 84. Judge Swygert held that competition among Kentucky brewers was "evidently stiffer than it was in Indiana for the prices charged by all brewers were lower in Kentucky." Vanco Beverage, 654 F.2d at 1233. He relied heavily on Callaway Mills to analyze the price discrimination issue differently than did Chief Judge Cummings:
The majority opinion and the district court both view the price discrepancies as a result of Falls City's raising its prices to its Indiana wholesalers. That statement is no more accurate than it would be to state that the differentials were caused by lowering the prices to Falls City's Kentucky customers. There was no norm or starting point against which such statements could be tested. Pricing policies are the result of competitive forces that develop over the years. The fact that brewers' prices, including Falls City's, have reached a higher level in Indiana than in Kentucky is only a reflection of those trends. Id (emphasis in original). from A.E. Staley stating that "Staley had not priced in response to competitors' discrete pricing decisions, but from the outset had followed an industry-wide practice of setting its prices according to a single, arbitrary scheme that by its nature precluded independent pricing in response to normal competitive forces." 90 Vanco Beverage, however, failed to demonstrate that Falls City's pricing practices in Evansville were collusive or violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Despite the district court finding that Evansville wholesale beer prices were "artificially high,"
91 Vanco Beverage did not establish the existence of an illegal pricing system in Evansville, Indiana. 92 Further, even though Falls City's prices in Indiana rose incrementally in response to a competitor's price increases, the district court should not have focused its attention on the Evansville price increases, but rather on whether Falls City's Henderson, Kentucky prices "remained lower in response to competitors' prices." ' 93 The Supreme Court required Falls City to justify on remand only its lower Henderson, Kentucky prices and not its higher Evansville, Indiana prices, absent any Sherman Act section 1 violation. Even if Falls City had set its Evansville prices collusively, the collusion would be "relevant to Vanco's Robinson-Patman Act claim only if it affected Falls City's lower Kentucky price." 94 The Court indicated that a seller may invoke the meeting competition defense even when it has implemented small price increases instead of price cuts. The Court found that Falls City's price increases in Kentucky did not defeat its meeting competition defense, because "nothing in section 2(b) requires a seller to lower its price in order to meet competition," especially in inflationary economic times when "vigorous price competition for a particular customer or customers may take the form of smaller price increases rather than price cuts. The Vanco Beverage Court also rejected the district court's finding that Falls City's profit-generating price increases in Evansville, and simultaneous, smaller price increases in Kentucky, would defeat the meeting competition defense. Citing Standard Oil v. FTC to support the proposition that a seller may meet competition on a selective basis, the Court indicated that a seller may "'retain a customer by realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to that customer, without necessarily freezing his price to his other customers.' ", 96 Thus, "section 2(b) does not require a seller, meeting in good faith a competitor's lower price to certain customers, to forego the profits that otherwise would be available in sales to its remaining customers. '97 At- tract New Customers. In the second component of its analysis, the Supreme Court ended a controversy among the circuits. The Ninth, Seventh and Fifth Circuits had held that a seller could utilize the section 2(b) defense to gain new customers, while the Second Circuit refused to permit a seller to offer a competitor's lower price to new buyers. 98 In Vanco Beverage, the Supreme Court held that section 2(b)
A Seller May Employ the Meeting Competition Defense to
does not distinguish between a seller who meets a competitor's lower price to retain an old customer and one who meets a competitor's lower price to gain new customers. 99
Area-wide Price Reductions are not Fatal to the Meeting Competition Defense.
The Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the section 2(b) defense'0° and held that area-wide price reductions or quantity discounts were permissible.' 0 ' A seller seeking to establish the meeting competition defense should not be required to expend significant efforts to confirm the lower price from each buyer when the seller reasonably knows in good faith from verified sources that its competitor's lower prices have been extended throughout the region. 02 The Vanco Beverage Court condemned a seller's area-wide response only when the seller responds to a "'preconceived pricing scale which [is] operative regardless of variations in competitor's prices.' "103 Thus, if a seller adopts a region-wide price reduction for existing or new customers in response to a rival's lower prices throughout the area, then the seller may find shelter under the section 2(b) umbrella.°4
The Court, after accepting the general proposition that section 2(b) sanctions area-wide reductions, briefly described the conditions that a seller must satisfy in order to meet competition in good faith on an area-wide basis. First, "a seller must limit its lower price to that group of customers reasonably believed to have the lower price available to it from competitors." 10 5 Second, the seller must adequately verify the underlying facts on which he reasonably believes that a competitor's lower price is available throughout the territory. 0 6 Third, the lower, area-wide price "may continue only as long as the competitive circumstances justifying it, as reasonably known by the seller, persist."' 0 7 In Vanco Beverage, the Court remanded the case because the lower courts did not examine whether Falls City's lower price in Henderson, Kentucky was a good faith, adequately verified response to its competitor's allegedly lower prices in Kentucky throughout the relevant time period. or quantity discount, or to offer a discount only in a specific region. On the other hand, the Court's holding in Vanco Beverage that an areawide price may be offered without an extensive analysis of the existence of a competitor's price within that same region may encourage a seller to offer different prices to buyers in different regions without examining the geographic boundaries of a competitor's price reductions.
The courts of appeals decisions to which the Court referred in Vanco Beverage would not have supported the area-wide pricing practice if a seller offered differing prices to buyers in various zones within the same geographic area. ' One of the purposes behind the allowance of territorial price reductions, which even the Vanco Beverage Court acknowledged, is to free the small seller from expending financial and administrative resources to confirm with individual buyers a competitor's area pricing practice. 112 The Court in Vanco Beverage suggests, however, under the guise of Standard Oil, that even within one unified region, a seller may adopt an area-wide price for one-half of the region while charging a different area-wide price for the other one-half of the same territory."1 3 By allowing an area-wide pricing response without sufficient analysis of the availability of a competitor's price within the same territory, the Court transformed an areawide pricing response from a privilege to a right. This result contravenes the policy behind area-wide pricing. If a seller offers the lower price to buyers in selected zones, the seller will have duplicated the individual contacts that the area-wide rule was designed to avoid. The small seller may use the cost-saving rationale as a pretext to offer areawide pricing on a selected basis.
Another factor which may limit the application of Vanco Beverage is that the case was premised on a factual setting that may not be adaptable to other industries. First, Indiana and Kentucky law prohibited wholesalers from selling outside their own states, and an Indiana statute forbade Indiana retailers from purchasing beer from out-of-state 118. The Court recognized the "catch-22" that these state pricing laws and unusual market definitions created for Falls City:
In such circumstances, had Falls City raised prices in Kentucky in lock-step with price increases in Indiana, it would have lost sales in Kentucky because its competitors would have been offering far lower prices. Raising its Kentucky prices only in Henderson County would not only have cost Falls City sales there, but also might have exposed Falls City to new Robinson-Patman Act claims, since Dawson Springs competed for sales with wholesalers in neighboring Kentucky counties. Nor, in such circumstances, could Falls City reasonably be required to charge Vanco the lower Kentucky price. Indiana law prohibited Falls City from doing so without simultaneously offering the same price to all other Indiana wholesalers.
Vanco Beverage, 103 S. Ct. at 1297. The result of the Court's ruling, however, may be that sellers are now free under the guise of area-wide pricing and Standard Oil to negotiate individualized, selective price cuts with preferred buyers to the detriment of other buyers in the same region.
IV. CONCLUSION
A seller may now unquestionably utilize area-wide price reductions, under the protective umbrella of the section 2(b) meeting competition defense, to attract new customers. No longer must a seller look first to the circuit in question prior to instituting a pricing reduction." 9 The Supreme Court in Vanco Beverage also answered a debate that, although not particularly pressing in the lower courts, raised some puzzling theoretical questions in inflationary times: A seller is now permitted to meet competition without reducing its prices. Thus, a seller may meet a competitor's slight price increase in a selected market while instituting larger price increases elsewhere without committing an act of price discrimination under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 20 Finally, the Court legalized a seller's adoption of a regional pricing response to a competitor's price reductions (or increases), even though the region may not be "intensely competitive."' 21 The seller, however, must respond to a competitor's area-wide prices in a "welltailored," reasonable, good faith, and prudent manner. At a minimum, the seller must adequately verify the existence of the competitor's territorial offer, carefully assess the parameters of the competitor's "pricing zone," and offer its price only to buyers within the region in which the competitor's new prices have been offered. In addition, the seller must adequately verify the duration of the competitor's area-wide prices, and limit its response to the same time period.
This commentator would also recommend, unless the unique factual setting of Vanco Beverage is present, that a seller offer its matching, area-wide pricing or discount response to all buyers within the selected geographic area. The Vanco Beverage area-wide price rule is sui generis, and should not be unthoughtfully extended beyond its intended scope. 
